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Danger: Derrida at work
JIM ARMSTRONG
Centre for Software Reliability, School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
The term ‘safety critical’ applies to a wide range of technologies, from car braking systems, through trains and
their signalling systems, to advanced air and space technology, both civil and military. It is a rather sophisticated
euphemism for ‘dangerous’; and like the word ‘safe’, it suggests the existence of some spectral but inherent property
beneficial to human health that could be lost under certain conditions, but does not have to be. How far can the
discourse about safety be trusted? And why are debates about risk sometimes so heated? In this paper it is proposed
that literary theory, particularly work on ‘deconstruction’ by philosopher Jacques Derrida, can shed some light
on these questions. Unsurprisingly, deconstruction cannot say much to safety engineers about the technicalities of
system building. But then again questions about whether and why we continue to build and rely upon safety critical
technologies are not simply technical; the language used in them is almost always politically charged.
The project ‘Deconstructive evaluation of risk in depend- them or reconstruct them.’2 If safety critical systems
are such an overpowering inheritance, the author isability arguments and safety cases’ (DERIDASC) is
experimenting with a consciously postmodern approach exhorting us to make a considerable ideological com-
mitment to the process of reconstructing them. Theto problems of language in debates about risk. There
are two aspects to this work. The first is more technical, author in question does not hide his dislike of the
nuclear industry; but even ‘play safe’ arguments againstand is concerned with the analysis of problems posed
by the process of assigning safety critical systems a particular risks often turn out to be arguments in
favour of risking something else instead (for example,‘safety certificate’. The second aspect concerns the
language used in explicitly political debates about social change).
the risks society should or should not accept. It is
on this latter, non-specialist aspect of DERIDASC Deconstruction
that this paper concentrates.
The language in risk debates is often emotive; we People who have been involved in an accident or ‘near
miss’ incident know how hard it can be to grasp eventsseem unable to avoid cliche´s, stereotypes, and rhetoric.
Consider remarks made by a US Energy Department and take prompt action as the situation is unfolding.
Professionals who examine witness statements oftenexpert about nuclear power station site cleanup require-
ments. In a recent issue of Scientific American, the complain about their unreliability, taken as they were
from people who were physically but perhaps notexpert stated that debates on the issue take place
‘in a world of ideologues. On the one hand, you have mentally present at the time. ‘Deconstruction’ links
these unreliabilities of the mind to its reliance on ‘signs’people saying, ‘‘It’s so safe you can put in your
Wheaties’’, and there are others saying ‘‘My baby for thinking about absent events or objects. The guru
of deconstruction, the philosopher Jacques Derrida,is going to die’’, or at least ‘‘My investors will be
nervous.’’ There is bad karma associated with these is a debunker of our (perhaps neurotic) desires for
meaning and certainty in life. Deconstruction aimssites. These are emotional, not rational responses.
We’d be in bad shape if people had these responses to diagnose cases of this desire (Derrida himself con-
centrates mainly on other philosophers). It tries toto gas pipelines and electric cables.’1 This pro-rational
statement, in its appeal to stereotypes and its terror discover the (often historical ) processes by which
we are brought to take the arbitrary as natural andof a counterfactual world without electric cables, is
itself distinctly ideological. For a very different view of the unsustainable as obvious: the key suspect is our
language.what is at stake, consider the following excerpt from
a classic sociological text on safety engineering: ‘These Deconstruction departs from an attack on the
idea that the relationship between the two aspectssystems are human constructions, whether designed
by engineers and corporate presidents, or the result of of the sign, the ‘signifier’ (a recognisable trace or
mark) and its ‘signified’ (a concept), can be anythingunplanned, unwitting, crescive, slowly evolving human
attempts to cope. Either way they are very resistant to more substantial than a socially instituted, habitually
reinforced, and (as the process of language changechange. Private privileges and profits make the planned
constructions resistant to change; layers upon layers demonstrates) unstable association. Ideologies rely on
certain signifiers to denote unique, stable, unquestion-of accommodations and bargains that go by the name
of tradition make the unplanned ones unyielding. But able, and precise signified concepts. Derrida is not
known for bluntness, but his philosophy is certainlythey are human constructions, and humans can destruct
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a refutation of the idea that a signifier could ever as between empiricism and idealism: writing and
reading involve an interaction between the materialhave a single, objective, self-interpreting meaning. He
is highly critical of philosophies that rely on certain (impressions on a surface) and the transcendental
(the meanings construed). Derrida’s philosophy haskey ‘transcendental signifiers’. He even argues that
the belief that the meaning of a term can be rendered been characterised as ‘quasi-transcendental’.6
Deconstruction can be seen as a questioning of theunquestionable constitutes a kind of eccentricity –
‘logocentricity’. Derrida argues that there is no assumption that words are the ‘clothes of thought’:7
we tend to think that our inner thoughts take place inreliable linkage between a material mark (of whatever
kind) and a self-contained meaning. Signifiers are a private language of the mind that is transparent to
us alone; and we then use whatever signifiers come toessentially ‘iterable’, by which he means detachable
from particular contexts of utterance or ‘inscription’; hand (words, icons, symbols) to embody these abstract
inner thoughts. However, our private ‘thought language’after all, signifiers are specifically intended for what
Derrida calls ‘grafting’ into new contexts. New con- would seem to be a language of transcendental mean-
ing which requires of us no interpretation. The ideatexts of interpretation are bound to make us conscious
of new associations. In the process our words gather of a representation that is identical to the represented
leads not to transcendental thought, but to the ideaand retain traces of meanings that we may not suspect
or might hope will pass unnoticed; over longer periods, of inscription as the meaning and subject of itself.
Derrida christens the subject born at this juncturethey may lose the meaning that was originally intended.3
Unable to constitute self-sufficient and freestanding ‘grammatology’.
Derrida’s Of Grammatology analyses the ‘sign’ asunits of meaning, language is haunted both by open-
ness to further interpretation, and by ‘absences’, that it is conceptualised in Western thought and finds it
full of contradictions. For example, ‘signifier’ is itselfis associations with non-explicit words. Derrida is
adept at analysing the role of words in texts that do thought of as a concept, but could as easily be viewed
as a precondition for conceptuality. A sign is saidnot even mention them!4
If meaning is a function of the context of utterance to consist of a ‘sensible’ signifier and an ‘intelligible’
signified; yet its recognition as a token requires that(or reading), then a full ‘literal’ explanation of mean-
ing becomes impossible. There is always a need to we discern an ideal identity in it, namely that of the
letter it is supposed to be an instance of. Derridaresort to either more of the same language or another
‘background’ language to reconstitute the lost context. notes that the identification of a signifier as a signifier
is actually an effect of its difference from the otherFor example, consider a dictionary: the meanings of
words are given only by means of other words. As we signifiers in the text in which it appears: as crosswords
illustrate, a letter that is entirely absent can some-descend the linguistic hierarchy we arrive at letters,
which are essential asemic (without meaning). Effects times be ‘discerned’ nonetheless from the identity
of the other letters. Gradually, Derrida extends thisof meaning arise only when we begin to combine
letters to give morphemes; these effects are weak until principle to encompass signified concepts. He con-
cludes that there is no essential or necessary core ofmorphemes are combined into words; they strengthen
as words are combined into sentences; sentences develop meaning encapsulated by a concept. No properties
can be defined to guarantee a concept’s uniqueness,still more elaborate meaning effects when combined
in texts; the meaning of texts is elaborated by their identity, self-sufficiency, and permanence. Instead,
conceptuality relies on a very elusive power of differ-social context (or the ‘social text’ as it is sometimes
called). One can go further, and indeed Derrida does. entiation that is a precondition for meaning. Derrida
calls it ‘diffe´rance’ (whilst noting that, as it is aHis most famous book, Of Grammatology,5 contains
the assertion ‘Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’, which in precondition for meaning, he cannot really ‘call’ it
anything!).8 As Derrida’s argument is very complex,the author’s view is most literally (if not elegantly)
translated into English as ‘the text has no outside’. we will resort to a crude example here: a logic with
only one truth value would be useless, but differ-When we look up from a book at the real world or
back down, no fundamental boundary between ‘text’ entiation between two truth values allows it meanings.
Indeed, logicians have experimented with varieties ofand ‘reality’ is crossed. The objects in our world do
not show us their true and underlying nature. They logic with many more truth values than ‘true’ and
‘false’, and we would hazard that Derrida wouldare signifiers that lead only to more signification and
never to any transcendental ‘reality’. Our existence is approve.
Derrida has used his minimalist model of languagea kind of ‘reading’. Contexts of utterance help to create
the meanings we experience, but contexts are always to conduct a fairly notorious critique of binaristic
thinking. (Since computing is directly based on binaryimperfectly understood, unpredictable, and there are
always more of them on the way. Our arguments mathematics, the likes of us computer scientists were
bound to catch on sooner or later.) Derrida argues thatare never wholly rational, since the meanings of the
terms we use in them are full of inherited history, binary distinctions lead us into hierarchical evaluations:
one term is evaluated as superior (Derrida calls it thearbitrariness, and even contradiction.
Derrida denies that his views are relativistic. He ‘presence’) and the other as inferior (the ‘absence’).
The basis of the evaluation is often unexplained:prefers to argue that the idea of inscription upsets
the opposition between relativism and objectivism, the inferior term may not be explicitly named, but
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this ‘excluded other’ is subtly indicated nonetheless. To relate this observation to safety engineering,
consider the following rather cutting critique of theDerrida’s ‘antiessentialist’ view of language implies
that each term of an opposition must construct its safety engineering profession: we believe ‘risk’ to be
some sort of substance that is emitted by physicalown identity in opposition to its other; the alternative
is a lapse into meaninglessness. So according to Derrida objects and processes at a rate that can be directly
and objectively measured. Some of our critics haveevery concept contains the trace of its opposite, and
mutual contamination between opposing concepts is asserted that we are adherents to a ‘phlogiston theory
of risk’.10 Derrida’s observations suggest reasons whyunavoidable. Derrida argues that logical thinking sup-
presses the fuzziness entailed by contamination between one might delude oneself that signifiers like ‘risk’ and
‘safety’ denote some sort of ‘phlogiston’, and alsoopposites through the construction and imposition of
distinctions which when rigorously examined sometimes why others might mistakenly think we believe this
when they examine our language.reveal themselves to be unintelligible. The attempt to
deny complexity and mutual dependence between so Derrida argues that resort to the logic of supple-
mentarity in a text marks a failure of distinction thatcalled ‘opposites’ leads us into a language of purity, of
contamination, and a bizarre ‘logic of supplementarity’ he calls an ‘undecidable’ or ‘aporia’. Such an impasse
is often marked by an appeal to transcendental signi-that we seem reluctant to question.
Discussing the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, fiers – ‘rhetoric’ to you and me. The deconstructor
attempts to diagnose the intractable problems hidden byDerrida explains the contradictions of this logic in
terms of the multiple meanings embedded in the word the rhetoric. The first operation in the deconstruction
of a binary opposition is ‘reversal’: the roles of origin‘supplement’.9 A supplement fills a lack in something
conceived of as original and rectifies its incomplete- and supplement are swapped; the implicit valuations
in the current argument are inverted to see whetherness. The ‘primary’ is often some idealised essence
or object: in deconstructive jargon it is the ‘origin’, the inverse valuation might not be just as (in)valid. The
second operation, known as ‘displacement’, involves‘centre’, or ‘presence’. Can privilege really be assigned
to an ‘origin’ simply because it preceded the supple- looking for the mutual dependences that hierarchical
evaluations of the terms overlook. Do oppositement? And if the supplement can be shown to be
necessary to the origin, what does it mean to claim dialectical positions conceal underlying problems
of tangled intractability? Or perhaps what is beingthat the origin ‘precedes’ the supplement? For example,
are origin and supplement in fact different aspects of explicitly argued is not what is really at stake.
Derrida’s claims have caused controversy in thesomething that precedes them both?
Derrida notes that a supplement often acts as a philosophical community, and his impenetrable, con-
voluted, and subtly humorous writing has even led tosubstitute for an origin (as a regent substitutes for
a monarch or an autopilot for a pilot). In this case, charges of fraudulence from other philosophers: but
perhaps the charge of external fraud is an excuse forthe supplement can supplant the origin. From the
viewpoint that privileges the origin, this supplanting internal bankruptcy. Valiant, if intemperate, attempts
to refute Derrida’s views have been made byis an inversion of the natural order: the supplement
becomes both necessary and dangerous to the origin. Raymond Tallis,11 John M. Ellis,12 and John Searle.13
Deconstructionist thinkers are not involved in aIn this case, dogmatism will be mobilised to try and
preserve the myth of the origin’s completeness and critique of language in the normal sense of that word:
they recognise that in order to communicate we haveself-sufficiency: the supplement will be denigrated as
both exterior to the origin and inferior to it. By a no choice but to construct our thoughts in signs and
transmit them by means of inscription, be it markscurious contortion of modalities, the supplement is seen
as contingently necessary but necessarily unnecessary. on surfaces or sounds in the air. The purpose of a
deconstructive reading is to seek out inevitable tensionsThis logic suppresses the contradiction involved in
an origin that both needs supplementation and does between what an author aims to reveal through the
text, its structure and logic, and the associations thatnot need supplementation. It also defies the law of
the excluded middle: it requires that the origin and are grafted onto its key signifiers during their passage
through the wider social context, whether the authorsupplement stand in opposition and yet implies a
degree of sameness between them. You may have likes it or not. Deconstruction shows that although
signifiers provide a kind of ‘access’ to referents andnoticed that we humans like to view the ‘opposite’
sex in this way. concepts, they set limits to that ‘access’ even as
they make it possible. As authors we might feel thatDerrida argues that the ‘logic of the supplement’
arises from the ‘metaphysics of presence’ in Western sign systems ‘get in the way’ of the subject matter we
want to capture. Derrida might prefer to say thatmodes of thinking. By ‘presence’ Derrida means the
dream of immediate mental access to reality or truth – signs initiate the creation of our ‘subject matter’ but
that they never quite finish the job; therefore, aunderstanding without recourse to mediation through
representation. Signifiers can be used to conjure careful and open minded reader, not overly con-
strained by any programmatic method for readingsignifieds with extremely doubtful unity and identity
(‘the moral majority’, ‘all right minded citizens’, ‘the (nothing annoys deconstructionist thinkers more than
the implication, inscribed in the title of this paper,public’, or, as Derrida likes to quip, ‘deconstruction’).
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that deconstruction is a predictable method), will to assertions that our position is ‘rational’ (a word
we rarely apply in the plural ). If the language of aalways be able to find new and interesting meanings
in our text. different viewpoint fails to explain itself, we presume
it must be ‘ideology’; yet when our own language
fails to persuade others we do not always draw theLooking out for safety
same conclusion. Yet every argument requires found-
ing assumptions that cannot be explained or justifiedSo what sort of context can deconstruction provide
for debates about risk? Opening a book on decon- within it. The meaning assigned to the words (or
symbols) we use is the most obvious example.structionist literary criticism, V. B. Leitch provides
an elegant classical metaphor for the dilemma of Now imagine you have been tasked with making
an argument that a system is ‘acceptably safe’ (or, ifproponents who debate risks.14 In Homer’s Iliad, the
night before the key battle, Trojan soldiers tremble you prefer, that it is unacceptably dangerous). You
encounter an observation or a piece of evidence thatin fear at what they see as a ‘portent of Zeus of the
aegis’: a passing eagle, having caught a large snake, does not fit the conclusion you have in view, for
example a new source of risk; or perhaps the logicis bitten by its struggling prey and drops it. Polydamas
and Hector look on. Polydamas denies his personal of your argument leads from your basic assumptions
to an intermediate conclusion you find unpalatable.authority as a soothsayer but contradictorily argues
that a real soothsayer would read the portent as saying What do you do? The very fact that you have
uncovered something ‘unpalatable’ indicates implicitthat just as the eagle harmed its prey yet failed to
triumph over it, so the Trojans will harm but not defeat assumptions about what you secretly hoped your
argument would show. Do you accept the unpalatablethe Greeks on the morrow. Hector is unimpressed.
He refuses to read anything into this alleged ‘sign’; and take a personal risk – i.e. being the messenger
who is shot for bringing bad news? Or do you pushbut as the author notes, this is nonetheless a reading
of it. Leitch summarises the dilemma facing these the problem to the back of your mind? A natural
hesitancy and uncertainty in the presence of theinterpreters in the context of the risk they are about
to take (fighting a battle): ‘Both interpreters tacitly unexpected is liable to lead to an incoherent mixture
of these different reactions; but the ‘look the otheragree that the sign may be meaningless. Thus any
eventual meaning must be to some extent arbitrated way’ option is very seductive because it entails less
immediate risk to the individual. It creates no immediateand arbitrary … a space exists between the sign and its
potential meaning. And another space opens between fuss. How to achieve it most easily? If one can only
control the meanings of words cleverly enough, oran assigned meaning whatever it may be and the actual
reality. These two openings constitute the spaces of keep them imprecise and vague enough, one can
attain a position in which an argument is circularinterpretation, the conditions under which any and
all interpretation is possible. To close these gaps, to or contradictory, and yet looks rational because the
contradictions lie in the meanings of its terms, notperform an interpretation, is necessarily to play the
rhetorician and the prophet.’ in the application of accepted rules of reasoning.
These contradictions can then be ‘safely’ pushed toThe dialectics of risk acceptance have to be under-
stood in terms of the shared limitation of all the the back of one’s mind, and one’s doubts dismissed
as ‘irrelevant’; but, eventually, an accident may findprotagonists – ignorance of the outcome of accept-
ance (or rejection). An argument about whether or us out.
not to take a risk is a messy business: it is as if the
two sides in a game were to be forced to negotiate No safety in words
refereeing decisions in the absence of a referee. Both
sides feel that the decision is urgent; both sides argue, That concern about problems of language arise
in safety engineering may seem surprising. Thewith an inevitable degree of internal doubt and con-
flict, that their own interpretation is the one the DERIDASC project was mentioned in introductory
remarks at a recent seminar given by Jacques Derridaabsent arbiter (the outcome) would impose if present.
To reject a risk is not necessarily to play safe, since at the University of York (28 May 2002). The audience
was highly amused by the idea that deconstructionavoidance of a risky action sometimes leaves some-
thing or someone else at risk. Parties to the debate had wormed its way even into the sciences (not that
safety engineering is really a ‘science’). However, sincetry to persuade by making possible outcomes ‘present’
to the thoughts of others through their descriptions the project began, a number of professionals have
expressed their concerns about interpreting safetyof the possibilities and consequences of action and
inaction; but in our descriptions, a common agree- documentation and standards; and, ironically, the
philosophical concern with language can be tracedment about what is significant and what is insignificant
often eludes us, as it eludes Hector and Polydamas. back to safety problems. For instance, Wittgenstein
first developed his ( later abandoned) ‘picture theory’Arguments can fail to persuade others, or mislead
us, because the language we use to argue, in its of language and logic from a newspaper report about
the investigation of a traffic accident: he read animplicit selection of what is insignificant, might be
implicitly assuming what we believe we are justifying. article about a French court case in which toy cars and
dolls had been used to simulate what had happened.15When our arguments fail in this way, we often resort
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The prehistory of deconstruction leads back to the similar causes, of which there were about twenty a year.
Management had decreed that these were inevitablelinguist Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf was among the
first thinkers to develop the idea that language plays in such an aged underground system, and could lead
only to mild smoke inhalation and minor damage. Soa role in fashioning our mental models of the world
rather than merely embodying them. Although extreme as not to alarm travellers (and perhaps themselves),
they had instructed staff to refer to such incidentsversions of Whorf ’s theory of ‘linguistic relativity’
are largely discredited today, subtler variants are still as ‘smoulderings’; not quite Orwellian Newspeak
in action, but clearly a lesson that tight control offinding favour.16 Indeed, there is some psychological
evidence that the distinctions embedded in language language does not provide control over the phenomenon
described. Indeed, it may indicate a lack of control:can determine our perceptions in subtle ways.
Verbal reasoning plays an important role in problem with apologies to Shakespeare, a fire by any other
name will burn as well.conceptualisation and solving.17
Before his turn to linguistics, Whorf trained as a
chemical engineer and worked as a fire safety officer No safety in things
in US chemical plants between the wars. He noted
that it is not easy to tell whether words simply reflect Do¨rner suggests that when we are presented with a
goal expressed in terms of a certain key term, weour attitudes towards hazardous objects or whether,
when we innocently pick them up from others, they should not assume that we are dealing with a single
problem; a little deconstruction of the key term willcause them. For example, tannery workers would treat
a so called ‘pool of water’ very lightly until informed often reveal a bundle of underlying problems that
are intertwined, perhaps viciously. At a recent safetythat this ‘water’ contained poisonous residues and
gave off potentially explosive methane gas. Whorf engineering conference a delegate examined NASA’s
‘faster, better, cheaper’ initiatives, and some of thealso noted that ‘empty drums’, which actually con-
tained flammable petrol residues, attracted groups much publicised failures and disappointments NASA
has recently suffered. The delegate summed up theof unsuspecting pipe smokers, that is until the word
‘empty’ was suitably qualified for them. lesson as: ‘Faster, better, cheaper? Pick any two.’ Key
goals can be mutually contradictory, or a single goalContemporary risk experts have also noted this use
of innocuous words to describe dangerous phenomena. might itself decompose into contradictory subgoals.
In these cases the ‘conceptual integration’ involvedIn The Logic of Failure,18 psychologist Dietrich
Do¨rner discusses research on decisionmaking in the in meaning construction leads to self-deception, double-
speak, failure, and disappointment. The enthusiasmgovernance of computer simulated societies and
ecologies. He notes that when our decisions lead us for the computerisation of airliner cockpits and flight
control systems provides a good example of howinto a practical impasse, we sometimes take refuge
in the construction of new verbal meanings. The this process works, and of how it tends to generate
controversy.19enforced dislocation between ideals and practice is
‘rationalised’ by changes in the meanings of words. Cockpit computerisation has been justified on the
basis that most flying accidents are caused by pilotDo¨rner notes that the construction of meaning involves
‘conceptual integration’, and that the integration error. Nonetheless, a pilot is always retained in order
to preserve safety should the computer system seemof incompatibles will lead to doublespeak. One of
Do¨rner’s subjects, for example, having thoughtlessly to be coping inadequately or fail. Does this make an
airliner ‘safer’? The question becomes much hardercommitted to a freeze on military expansion and a
foreign war in rapid succession, attempted to extricate to answer once we consider possible changes of
human behaviour in response to the new ‘safer’himself from his predicament via the introduction of
‘voluntary conscription’. circumstances. Greater cockpit computerisation has
led to incidents in which airline crews have misunder-In philosophy, there is a complex debate about the
degree to which words reflect our pre-existing thoughts stood the autonomous actions of computerised con-
trol systems, and have made botched interventionsand attitudes or determine them; but the idea that we
not only accept contradictory meanings, but impose with hair raising and occasionally tragic results.20
It has also imposed a relaxed level of involvementthem on others as a means of control, has been
familiar to everyone since the publication of Orwell’s in flying that leaves crews ill placed to respond to
sudden and unexpected demands for intervention;1984. In safety engineering, meaning control is some-
times exercised, not exactly dictatorially, but clumsily. and the computer system provides something new for
the crew to blame when they fail to discharge theirOn 18 November 1987, a catastrophic flash fire
exploded in the ticket hall of King’s Cross under- responsibilities.
The dispute about ‘operator centred’ and ‘auto-ground station in London, killing thirty-one people.
The causal chain leading to the fatal ‘flashover’ effect mation centred’ systems marks an impasse for those
embarked upon the search for greater engineeredbegan with the ignition of an agglomeration of grease,
fluff, and rubbish under an escalator, probably by a safety in airliners. Researchers have found that early
safety problems with computerised airliners arosediscarded cigarette or match. The subsequent report
criticised the management of London Underground because supposedly well accepted principles of cock-
pit design (e.g. that cockpit displays and controlsfor its complacent attitude to less harmful fires with
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should have few modes, be visually unambiguous, accidents necessarily reflect the quality of our risk
management strategies. When interpreting changesand provide good tactile feedback) were forgotten in
the prevailing enthusiasm for computerisation. These in accident rates it is very difficult to explain how
far they are affected by our interventions and how farubiquitous principles minimised the (rhetorical ) gap
between what aircraft designers intended a particular they are due to processes over which we exert no
control. Much of our reasoning about safety involvescontrol to demonstrate, and what the crew could
understand by it. Brutal visual and tactile simplicity us in counterfactual assertions, of the form ‘if we
had not done X, accident Y would have happened’;in cockpit design was highly valued.21 The critical and
difficult question is whether the impasse is temporary; but since counterfactual statements are defined in
opposition to real events, they cannot be proven orand whether in the end, requirements for ever more
aircraft safety than we currently enjoy (accident rates disproven. They are often difficult for non-experts
to comprehend. When we consider alternative futureare proverbially low) do not turn out to be implicit
requirements for superbeings, be they pilots or designers, possibilities, the unpredictable element of chance seems
irreducible; yet once hindsight shows us the actualwho can bring certainty to an uncertain world.
In any case, the troublesome early history of com- outcome it seems predetermined. What was once
thought to be a matter of luck begins to look like anputerised airliner cockpits illustrates the disappoint-
ments engineers might encounter if they pursue inevitability. When accidents occur, risk professionals
are as prone as anyone to pass from optimistic ‘cheer‘obvious’ goals such as ‘greater safety’ without very
concrete ideas of what is meant. In this regard, Do¨rner up, maybe it’ll never happen’ attitudes to the pro-
duction of self-consciously penetrating ‘accident wait-quotes Bertolt Brecht’s aphorism that advocates of
progress often have too low an opinion of what ing to happen’ analyses. These studies sometimes lead
to sententious (‘this must never happen again’) con-already exists.22 The original line of thought was that
since aircrew error caused most accidents, handing clusions about preventative measures that are either
disregarded as too expensive or constitute a differentmore decisionmaking authority over to computers
would reduce their incidence; but since this policy set of risks.
It is mistaken to think of safety as a single propertycannot be followed unilaterally with current tech-
nology, new possibilities for man–machine conflict that can be engineered into a system, and objectively
verified to be present or absent. We engineer propertiesand new forms of risk taking become possible.
Safety engineers who do not heed Do¨rner’s warning into systems to support safety goals, but the goals
are a result of our initial perception that a system ismay be committing themselves to engineering a property
into their systems that does not exist. Definitions of dangerous. This perception is more of a projection
rather than a property of the design: anything issafety used in the engineering profession are notice-
ably vague.23 Safety is usually characterised as free- injurious or fatal in the right (wrong?) context.
‘Inherently safe’ systems are just those for whichdom from either ‘unacceptable’ risk or risk ‘not
greater than the limit risk’; but definitions generally injurious contexts are unprecedented or implausible.
For the rest, we either avoid imagining the unpleasantdo not indicate the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions determining ‘acceptability’ or ‘limit’; and in contexts or hope that they can be endlessly evaded
with cleverness. The nuclear expert quoted in thethe various domains, entire standards are written on
the subject of ‘acceptable’ safety. Leveson has offered introduction used the term ‘bad karma’ to describe
attitudes to nuclear sites. Belief in inherent dangera more forthright definition: ‘Safety is freedom from
accidents and losses’;24 but is a system safe because (and inherent safety) is indeed a kind of superstition
somewhat akin to a belief that spirits from the futureit has not yet caused any accidents or losses, or
because it cannot? What might it mean to say that haunt our world.
The concept of the ‘near miss’ incident reveals thea system ‘cannot’ cause an accident? As Douglas
and Wildavsky have put it: ‘Try not to get into an contradiction involved in our intuitive ideas of safety.
In a study of the US nuclear deterrent during theargument about reality and illusion when talking
about physical dangers.’25 Cold War,26 Scott D. Sagan comments: ‘there is an
irony here that we could call the Catch 22 of closeSafety is a noun that refers to a nebulous and
moving target. There is always a level of dislocation calls: the more near accidents I discover, the more it
could be argued that the system worked, since thein the relation between the words ‘acceptably safe’
and what they are supposed to describe. ‘Acceptability’ incidents did not in the end lead to an accidental
nuclear war.’ An empirically verifiable character-varies from one domain of human activity to another,
according to historical precedent and changes in isation of safety and danger would require hindsight:
the most irresponsible act, if it succeeded, wouldmoral standards. Even where the rate of accidents we
tolerate is well known (for example on the roads), be safe; if it resulted in injury or death it would be
dangerous. Such a characterisation would be tauto-initiatives for safety improvements are constantly put
forward, indicating the de facto unacceptability of logical and thus useless as a basis for choosing a
course of action. Lack of information about thethis de jure ‘acceptance’.
Safety professionals are rather attached to the outcome is precisely the reason a decision is required,
and indeed what makes a decision possible. Thisidea that their work is ameliorative; but one can
question whether changes in the frequency of failure of empiricism, if we are not too careful, can
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lead us to the opposing mistake of idealism. Even if essences that we conjure in our debates about risk
include representations of people. We have alreadyit does not, language requires that we talk about
‘safety’, ‘risk’, ‘likelihood’, and ‘possibility’ as meta- seen the stereotypes in our opening quote from a
nuclear expert. Even the most rational of texts aboutphorically substantive, and this could lead others to
mistake us for adherents to the phlogiston theory of risk seem to rely on stereotypes. Cultural theories
of risk divide us into ‘hierarchists’, ‘egalitarians’,risk; but you will find that you cannot think about
safety without the notion that ‘it’ (what?) can be ‘individualists’, and ‘fatalists’. John Adams tells how
Norman Fowler, then UK Secretary of State formanipulated, reduced, increased. Safety places us
in a very Derridean double bind: we are forced to Transport, was accused of being an ‘accessory to
mass murder’ for his opposition to seat belt laws, byuse a certain form of language in order to think and
talk about it, and we should recognise that this form the British Medical Association no less. Adams him-
self has been accused (by a politician) of holdingof language implies a metaphysics that is strictly
speaking nonsensical; yet to continue to refer to (and views about the matter that are ‘symbolic of a sick
society’.27question) the element of uncertainty in our decisions,
we have to represent that element metaphorically as Stereotyping is a sure sign that a ‘rational’ argu-
ment has run out of logic. DERIDASC has examinedsomething we can manipulate.
Indeed, it is hard to explain what unites the vast recent research into ‘critical thinking’, which attempts
to analyse textual arguments according to the principlesarray of properties that engineers design into systems
under the guise of ‘increased safety’. When abstracted of logical deduction. Proponents of this form of
analysis encounter serious difficulties in trying tofrom any basis in outcomes or specific properties of
specific types of system, phrases like ‘intrinsic safety’ explain the difference between a proper representation
of an opposing view and the so called ‘straw manand ‘intrinsically dangerous’ become increasingly
vacuous. This may be why design engineers prefer fallacy’. This fallacy involves a circular justification
process in which an inaccurate representation of anthe concrete details of system design. It is common
practice to leave the job of producing safety argu- opposing viewpoint is constructed and ‘brilliantly’
demolished. The performance looks less scintillatingments to ‘independent’ consultants. Exploring every
possible context in which a system might perform if impostures in the representation of the opposing
view can be identified. Postmodern authors are fondany of its actions, and taking action to forestall
all those that could lead to injury or death, is an of the phrase ‘all representation is misrepresentation’.
For example, I am conscious of the fact that con-intractable problem (the engineering of complex
computer software is a particular problem in this scious simplifications (and no doubt the unconscious
blunderings) in my text do injustices to Derrida, hisregard). Thinking of ‘risk’, ‘safety’, and ‘danger’ as
properties with some sort of independent existence is colleagues, his detractors, my colleagues, Charles
Perrow, Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky, Johna mental simplification strategy that leads all too
easily to category mistakes. The phantom ‘potentials’, Adams, and others. Only readers can do something
like the ‘justice’ required to identify and discount‘possibilities’, and ‘likelihoods’ we imagine lurking
inside certain systems are all in the mind. Thinking such deficiencies (it is for this very reason that Derrida
has questioned the notion that a text could, or evenabout safety tends to bring out our metaphysical
tendencies. should, have a single determinate meaning). Whilst
there are greater and lesser degrees of accuracy inIt seems to some that safety professionals believe
they can measure and quantify these metaphysical representations of people, in the end all representation
is inaccurate: a representation is a poor substitutepotentials. Sociologists and cultural theorists believe
this to be impossible. In our view, the difficulties of for what it represents; but although stereotyping of
opposing views is often thought of as unjust, ourthe debate derive from the fact that few would believe
in the phlogiston theory of risk if questioned about examination of various texts on risk has suggested
that it most often functions as a literary device toit, but that everyone is using language that implies it;
but the fact that we can measure the height of an avoid the bathos involved in the repetition of familiar
lessons that people still seem inclined to forget.object need not imply that we think there is something
called ‘height’ in it. In this respect safety is no Let us consider an example (and thus commit an
injustice). Safety professionals usually define risk indifferent from any other behaviour we try to engineer
into a system; unfortunately, people do sometimes terms of two factors, ‘probability’ and ‘consequence’.
Theorists who share our doubts about the phlogistonseem to feel it is different.
theory of risk regard the ‘probability’ factor (when
expressed statistically) as the sort of phantom thatNo safety in people
takes on whatever shape ‘elites’ wish it to. In Normal
Accidents, sociologist Charles Perrow argues that theRisk, safety, and danger are not the only metaphysical
phantoms that should not be mistaken as substantive. consequence factor is more important.28 We should
build only those systems that degrade gracefully,In constructing an argument for or against taking a
particular risk, one imagines any possible counter- fail safely, or allow for easy and uncomplicated
interventions in response to the unexpected. A safearguments and tries to forestall them; this has
been amusingly dubbed ‘prebuttal’. The metaphysical system minimises the gap between the intentions and
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expectations of its operators and the actual con- more. Dangerous performance deficiencies have been
perceived in aircrew. The solution suggested by air-sequences of its behaviour. Where we can conceive
of circumstances that would require urgent inter- craft designers is to supplement crew skills with
greater computerisation; but in the process somethingvention, especially where the information presented
to operators could be overwhelming or contradictory, (overconfidence of designers?) leads to the privileging
of automated decisionmaking over aircrew decision-we should consider accidents as ‘normal’ (inevitable)
sociotechnical occurrences. making. The supplement begins to supplant. Greater
cockpit computerisation was strenuously resisted by‘Normal accident theory’ argues that safety critical
systems are dangerous because the production pressures aircrew who felt that cockpits should remain pilot
centred. Both views are problematic: an automationare in conflict with safety goals. System complexity
and interconnectivity make possible a huge range of centred view is undermined by its residual dependence
on a human ‘supplement’; and the pilot centred viewsystem states and behaviours that cannot be foreseen
or even easily recognised by operators when they is undermined by the human error factor in air
accidents. The roles of ‘supplement’ and ‘centre’ canoccur. Tightly centralised control is imposed on these
systems in order to avoid the onset of states known to be exchanged. It is not easy to see which policy will
cause fewer accidents. For example, the need tobe hazardous; yet, since nobody believes that centralised
procedures can prevent unknown hazardous states, subordinate one form of decisionmaking to another
only makes sense if there are possibilities for conflictmechanisms for decentralised on the spot inter-
ventions are built in; but these engineered loopholes between the two. A policy of subordination in conflict
introduces possibilities for the authoritative party tocan then be used as bypasses to relieve production
pressures to the detriment of safety. Managers in override the subordinated party unsafely. Reversing
origin and supplement merely creates possibilities ofpursuit of production and profit are able to impose
operative shortcuts, risky improvisations, and unsafe the ‘opposing’ form. Two myths seem to have fuelled
the controversy: that of the omniscient designer whointerventions upon the operators. The moral of
normal accident theory is that we should not grasp can foresee all eventualities, and that of the pilot in
perfect harmony with his aircraft. The history ofat probability theory to convince ourselves that the
unexpected is unlikely to occur; and we should not aviation is replete with counterexamples to both.30
What of binary oppositions? Fortuitously, the safety/blame fallible human operators when it does. However,
we should blame the ‘elites’ who manage the socio- danger opposition has already been deconstructed by
risk theorists who may not know much Derrida.technical system; and we should be wary of the arrogant
delusions of the ‘great designers’, Perrow’s term for Experts soon found that our attitudes to risk are not
always consistent with the idea that safety is positivedesigners who think their systems are intrinsically
safe. and danger negative. Even the most cautious of us
will occasionally see dangers as adding spice to life.This stereotypical misrepresentation of elites has a
curiously contradictory function in Perrow’s text. The The common factor underlying our apparently incon-
sistent choices is the degree of personal freedom weauthor has an openly expressed liberal political bias:
‘The corporate and military risk takers often turn feel we have. Our freedom is a question of access
to finite resources: evidently then, my free choicesout to be surprisingly risk averse (to use the jargon
of the field) when it comes to risky social experiments could rob you of yours. If you feel that I am engaged
in an activity that poses risk to you, naturally youthat might reduce poverty, dependency and crime’
his text declaims;29 but the idea that the fallibility react negatively; whereas if you are free to choose
or refuse a risk, your reactions and decisions willof operators and that of elites have the same roots
gives him a hard time in maintaining the myth that normally be consistent (although cases where people
act impulsively against their usual inclinations arethe blunderings of elites are incomprehensible and
egregious, whereas the blunderings of operators are particularly fascinating).
The question of whether we are ‘free’ to engage inentirely predictable and understandable. The logic of
normal accident theory is that elites should be viewed or refuse a risky act is itself an uncertain one. So
many risky activities (driving, flying, using electricity,as fallible operators of complex sociotechnical systems.
Whilst the author seizes on various opportunities indulging in sports) are a ubiquitous part of our social
inheritance. We are under social pressure to engageto pillory ‘elites’, his text is surreptitiously aimed at
elite readers. After all, the logic of his argument is in many of them; yet choice is no doubt a factor. For
instance, how far do you feel ‘free’ to give up, say,that the most dangerous systems render the rest of
us rather helpless. The risk the author takes with his driving for the sake of your safety? How would it
affect those close to you if you did? How would othertext is that the oversimplification in his portrayal of
elites could alienate this implied audience. people react? The question of our relative freedom
usually only occurs to us when we either see some-
thing go wrong or cause it ourselves (for exampleMyths to die for
if we nearly suffer an accident). Confronted with
the reality of the limits of our perceptions and self-Can we discern Derrida’s ‘logic of supplementarity’
generating its wasteful heat in controversies about control, in our helplessness we have either a tendency
to appeal for action to others (the government, therisk? Consider airliner cockpit computerisation once
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professions), or an impulse to blame something or level, we will tend to exploit the increased safety
in this situation as a sort of capital; we will invest insomeone else for what has gone wrong. The tendency
is to look anywhere except within for an explanation more risk until we return to our tolerance level. The
theory is suggestive of some sort of mental ‘economy’of the problem; to pass it, and therefore the risk, on
to someone else. of risk. If it is correct, the safety regulators’ hope
of making life safer for everyone may be doomed toOur deconstructionist analyses of arguments against
taking particular risks (for example using nuclear disappointment. It should be noted, however, that
risk compensation theory is rather controversial. Thepower) usually reveal them to be implicit invitations
to accept different risks; eliciting these invitations is theory might be taken to imply that the public’s
intuitive approach to safety is irresponsible comparedour peculiarly literary way of testing out the theory
of ‘risk compensation’, as discussed in the next section. with the impersonal quasi scientific approaches of the
safety engineering profession; but as Charles Perrow
points out, this view ignores inequalities in our abilitiesThe risk economy
to choose which risks we take.32 In DERIDASC, we
are looking for evidence of risk compensation in textsIf Derrida’s thinking is along the right lines, language
lands us short of a clear distinction between the com- and arguments rather than in behaviour.
The main difficulty in applying risk compensationplex material world and the metaphysical language
we adopt to abstract and simplify it. So it will never theory is remaining sceptical of one’s own objectivity.
Risk compensation theory implies the doubtfulbe easy for even the most hardheaded engineer to
avoid confusion between the two. The metaphysical assumption that there is an objective definition of
what a risk is. The notion of a personal risk ‘level’abstraction called ‘safety’, at its most abstract, is none
too coherent. Yet we act according to a metaphor implies some sort of tolerance degree marked off on
an objective scale, so that people can be ranked fromwhose logic is that safety can be manipulated in the
same way that physical quantities can. We conceptualise risk averse to risk addicted. It is presupposed not
only that there is an objective definition of risk, butsafety and danger as opposing ‘substances’ that can
be exchanged, balanced, and traded off in processes of that we all share it; indeed, there must be a ‘quantity’
of it represented somewhere that determines ouradaptation. What really happens is that we manipulate
the physical world and (mis)represent this manipulation behaviour. The concept of the risk thermostat is a
‘transcendental signified’ with a vengeance; but howto ourselves metaphysically. Our thinking about risk
functions with the rhythms of an economy even before far are observations of the frequency of accidents
suffered by individuals sufficient to distinguish betweenwe are quite sure what its units should be. Derrida’s
thinking thus sheds some light on the origins of the a state of risk addiction and bad luck? And sometimes
our individual notions of risk seem incommensurablephlogiston theory of risk and its problems.
Is this metaphor tenable? We can only make and negotiations are fraught.
The status as ‘risks’ of events that could have nomeaningful tradeoffs where we know the total potential
of ‘safety’ and ‘danger’ to which we are exposed; for benefit to anyone (for example possible causes of
human extinction) is not controversial; but risk assess-example, in order to make a meaningful statistical
estimation of a particular outcome, we need to know ment nearly always involves us in the weighing of
costs against benefits. People do not always agree onhow many other possible outcomes there are. Adams
has drawn a distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ whether something is a cost or a benefit; and in any
argument in favour of (ex)changing the actual foras follows: with ‘risk’ we know the odds, but not the
outcome, and with ‘uncertainty’ we do not even know the sake of the possible there is usually someone who
feels they will lose out. In what we call risk deferral,the odds.31 Uncertainty robs us of any precise way
of trading off safety and danger to achieve a balance. a cost is paid now for the sake of the benefits that it
could bring in the future. In ‘expenditure’, benefitsSo we prefer to think that we do know the odds. In
deconstructing rationalistic arguments about risk, we that may bring costs in the future are enjoyed now.
That a benefit to someone else can seem a cost tolook for ways in which problems of meaning indicate
that uncertainties are being misrepresented as calculable. oneself (and vice versa) leaves us with the problem
of how to decide whether a risk is of the first orThe deconstruction of a probabilistic argument in
favour of a risk (most safety arguments are in some second kind. The word ‘may’ brings us even more
problems. Future developments can overturn faith insense statistical ) involves trying to make explanatory
text ‘admit’ that it is an attempt to misrepresent our own attributions of cost and benefit to the various
activities we engage in (for example, some smokersuncertainty as calculated risk. This misrepresentation
is a risk in itself. At this point our analysis links up sue tobacco companies after getting lung cancer).
Psychologists working on ‘cognitive dissonance theory’with the theory of ‘risk compensation’. This theory
argues that individuals have an inbuilt level of risk have noticed how people tend to ‘reverse engineer’
their concepts of cost and benefit in order to mini-tolerance. The ruthless exploitation of ABS braking
by motorists is often cited as an example. Adams mise discordance between their ideals and the con-
sequences of their decisions. In DERIDASC, we takeuses the metaphor of the ‘risk thermostat’ to explain
the theory: when we perceive that the risks to which an interest in this (somewhat un-Derridean) psycho-
logical theory because attributions of cost and benefitwe are exposed are below our personal tolerance
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determine whether a particular risk appears accept- where decisions have to be taken in conditions of
able or unacceptable; one can try to deconstruct these uncertainty. It is claimed that ‘technocrats’ attempt
attributions by reversing them in a game of devil’s to shelter themselves from open debate about ethical
advocate. After all, to ask whether one should take and political issues behind quasi scientific language.
a risk or not is really to ask whether taking the risk Calculative algorithmic criteria for risk acceptance
would be a cost or a benefit. A key determinant are attractive to technocrats because they promise
is what investment the proposer of the argument absolution from personal responsibility for the choices
makes in their favoured outcome. We hypothesise ‘dictated’ by the calculations; but it is argued that no
that everyone in the economy of risk, even other means of risk construction can be culturally neutral.
authors who share the same postmodern perspective, In summary, the risk assessment profession is charged
is keen to promote their own interests once they have with misrepresenting uncertainty as calculated risk.
deconstructed the interests of others. Risk and Culture by Mary Douglas and Aaron
Wildavsky is a classic text in this genre. Its authors
argue that ‘It is a travesty of rational thought toThe risks in refusing risks
pretend that it is best to take value-free decisions
The rhetorical temperature in debates about risk in matters of life and death.’36 They claim that
is often high. The terms of reference for the 1992 arguments about risk are really arguments about
Royal Society report Risk: Analysis, Perception and different cultural values. For example, the authors
Management stated that its committee members should interpret sectarian aversion to environmental risk
‘… consider and help to bridge the gap between what is as a disguised critique of the existing ‘hierarchical’
stated to be scientific and capable of being measured, (bureaucratic) and ‘individualist’ (entrepreneurial )
and the way in which public opinion gauges risks institutions. They state that ‘the real choices that lead
and makes decisions’.33 Note the ‘deconstructible’ most directly to dangerous decisions are choices about
opposition here: there is an implied privileging of the social institutions … The upshot of our whole argu-
‘scientific and measurable’ over ‘the way in which ment is that we should listen to the plaint against
public opinion gauges risks’. Or is there? No doubt institutions. Instead of being distracted by dubious
the prioritisation could be reversed. This ambiguity calculations, we should focus our analysis just there,
caused so many internal disputes that the final report, on what is wrong with the state of society.’
being full of contradictory statements, was not issued The risk assessment profession is accused of imposing
as a considered representation of the views of the
its own prejudices under a pretence of objective
Royal Society as a whole, but rather as a collection
rationalism: ‘The risk assessors offer an objective
of miscellaneous contributions. For example, in a
analysis. We know that it is not objective so long
chapter entitled ‘Estimating engineering risk’ a group
as they are dealing with uncertainties and operatingof safety engineering professionals argue that risk
on big guesses. They slide their personal biases intomust be expressed as a measurable attribute in order
the calculations unobserved. The expert pretendsto give engineers an objective to satisfy (chapter 2,
to derive statements about what ought to be fromp. 26); but in the chapter on ‘Risk perception’ a
statements about what is. The individual tends tovariety of authors from other disciplines (sociology,
start from ought and so does not subscribe to thepolitical economics, cultural theory) state that the
ancient fallacy’ (p. 80). Paradoxically these ‘pretensionsdistinction between objective and subjective risk assess-
to objectivity’ seem all too evident to the authors; inment is unsustainable (chapter 5, p. 89). John Adams
that case, what is their problem?reviews the confusion with a mixture of amusement,
That there is something ‘wrong’ with the state ofbemusement, and sympathy.34 The pattern of this
society implies a gap between the way society is andintractable wrangle repeated itself in the polarised
the way it ought to be – a cultural bias. Indeed, thereactions of readers of the report. In a followup text,
authors recognise that a theory postulating that thereAccident and Design, some of the protagonists con-
are no objective and culture free methods for risktinue the debate, but with little sign of convergence.35
selection and prioritisation must be culturally biasedOn the one hand, risk assessment professionals
itself. The penultimate sentence of the book is anassume that subjective biases have to be avoided.
exhortation to the reader: ‘Since we do not knowThey choose scientific terms, precise metrics, and draw
what risks we incur, our responsibility is to createon existing engineering language for constructing
resilience in our institutions.’ In the final sentence,their models of risk. Technical safety engineering
the authors declare their own cultural biases: ‘Byinvolves the production of computer simulations,
choosing resilience, which depends on some degreemathematical models, quasi scientific documents, and
of trust in our institutions, we betray our bias towarda large amount of painstakingly dull ‘box ticking’
the center.’ The term ‘center’ refers to the hierarchicalbureaucracy. The representations of risks used tend
and individualistic (enterprise capitalist) forms of socialto exclude non-experts from detailed involvement.
organisation described in the fifth chapter of the book.On the other hand, cultural theorists argue that
The title of that chapter is ‘The center is complacent’.subjective biases cannot be avoided. Risk assessment
How does this alliance with complacency ‘listen’ toprofessionals are attacked for their blindness to
the inevitability of bringing to bear cultural biases the ‘plaint against social institutions’?
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Presumably, listening to the plaint against shuttle disaster enquiry, one investigator, the famous
physicist Richard Feynman, commented: ‘If a guyinstitutions means more than free expression. The
authors want institutional change. Change implies tells me the probability of failure is 1 in 105, I know
he’s full of crap.’38 Feynman was unimpressed byinstitutional destabilisation in the short term for
‘resilience’ in the longer term, a short term cost that risk assessors because they had become so detached
from the realities of everyday safety engineering towill hopefully bring long term benefits. In other words,
the authors are asking beneficiaries of the ‘center’ to which their words were supposedly relevant. The
mere use of technical language does not prove anyset their immediate benefits at risk; to defer some of
their current risk expenditure. involved understanding of the activities described.
Ironically, our excursion into postmodernismThe question is why institutions that acknowledge
their subjectivity and cultural biases should be more and its consideration of the insecurities of meaning
has led us to very modernist conclusions about the‘resilient’ than those that subsist on ‘pretences to
objectivity’. In their closing sentence the authors say importance of plain speaking in safety arguments.
The key problem is whether some of our technicalthey ‘betray’ a bias toward the center. What does this
mean? A ‘betrayal’ of a bias only has to reveal it as language is somehow incommensurable with everyday
language, and thus not fully explicable to the laya bias. The bias becomes unworthy of acceptance
as a truth and its subversion is initiated. Yet after public. Safety engineers seem to believe in the exist-
ence of a ‘language barrier’. For example, whenlaying a charge of institutional precariousness to
motivate more resilient institutions, the authors make pressed by journalists for an opinion about the
initiation of the DERIDASC project, a nuclear experta positive gesture of identification with those whose
‘biases’ they have just subverted. commented that nuclear safety cases were ‘very, very
technical documents’. This statement is no doubt trueWe have found this contradictory double gesture
(as Derrida might call it) to be implicit in many enough: but what does it portend from a lay view-
point? Our eventual failure to understand nucleararguments that try to persuade others to become or
remain involved in enterprises that pose risks to them. safety cases? A gesture of relief given the obvious
impotence of our proposed method of scrutiny? IfNote how one cannot tell whether the gesture is
subversive or supportive: Douglas and Wildavsky the former, we appreciate the dilemma: the logic of
our argument has been that the relationship betweenattempt to characterise their text as a gesture of
support for the ‘center’ disguised as its subversion; signifiers and meanings is a fickle one, and no doubt
many nuclear experts responsible for public com-but it could just as easily be viewed as a gesture
of subversion disguised as support. To make the munication by now feel that whatever they say, those
with antinuclear leanings will eventually find a waydistinction, one needs to know what the proposers
would risk were their proposal to be accepted. When to turn their words against them.
A language barrier serves to define groups ofone invests personally in a risk, it focuses the mind
wonderfully. experts as socially distinct; but this alleged barrier
is not respected within the mind of the individual
expert, who is, after all, also a member of the public.In conclusion
Education, because it involves articulating technical
terms into simpler language, proves both that languageOur first attempt at deconstruction looked at the
‘probability’ and ‘consequence’ definition of risk barriers exist and that experts can transgress them
when the need arises. Hence, before taking sheltermentioned earlier. In safety cases these factors are
expressed respectively as a probability and a number inside our technical language, safety professionals
should first check to see whether it is not safer outside.of fatalities/injuries. They are normally assumed to
be independent variables. We quickly realised that
this assumption of independence omits what should
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